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NOTES
PROCREATIVE CHOICE FOR THE INCOMPETENT
DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED:
CONSER VATORSHIP OF VALERIE N.
Recognition of constitutional rights for the developmentally disabled, has
occurred only recently 2 and has generated considerable controversy.3 Histor1. For the purposes of this Note the term "developmentally disabled" will refer exclusively to individuals who suffer from mental retardation. Mental retardation is defined by the
American Association of Mental Deficiency as "subaverage general intellectual functioning
which originates during the developmental period and is associated with impairment in adaptive
behavior." See North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp.
451, 453 (M.D.N.C. 1976); Haggerty, Kane & Udall, An Essay on the Legal Rights of the Mentally Retarded, 6 FAM. L.Q. 59, 65 (1972).
Not all mentally retarded individuals are incompetent, however, and some disabled individuals may have the capacity for the informed consent necessary to obtain or refuse a voluntary
sterilization operation. See Neuwirth, Heisler & Goldrich, Capacity, Competence and Consent:
Voluntary Sterilization of the Mentally Retarded, 6 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 447 (1975).
This Note is primarily concerned with the rights of those mentally retarded individuals incapable
of informed consent.
2. See Dowben, Legal Rights of the Mentally Impaired, 16 Hous. L. REV. 833, 83334 (1976) (discusses the history of treatment of the mentally retarded from the 18th century to
the present, and states that increased availability of federal funding in the 1950s and 1960s
led to the development of mental health and retardation programs).
3. Not everyone is pleased that the developmentally disabled are being allowed to leave
the institutions to live in community living arrangements. Programs designed to promote the
mentally retarded individual's ability to survive in society are financed by state and federal
funding. The use of public tax money to support training programs for these living arrangements
is also a controversial issue. See generally Price & Burt, Sterilization, State Action, and the
Concept of Consent, I LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 57 (1975) (argues that the lack of state and
federal funding of programs for the mentally retarded is. being used as an excuse for the nonvoluntary sterilization of the incompetent developmentally disabled).
In addition, many communities are reluctant to allow the developmentally disabled to live
in group homes in their area, primarily because of inordinate fear of the retarded. See generally
Chandler & Ross, Zoning Restrictions and the Right to Live in the Community, reprinted in
THE MENTALLY RETARDED AND THE LAW 305 (M. Kindred ed. 1976) (many communities are
reluctant to grant zoning variances for individuals planning to construct group homes for the
mentally retarded); Lippincott, "A Sanctuary for People": Strategies for Overcoming Zoning
Restrictions on Community Homes for Retarded Persons, 31 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1979) (discusses the various ways to avoid zoning restrictions designed to keep the mentally retarded out of
the community); Comment, Can the Mentally Retarded Enjoy "Yards That Are Wide?", 28
WAYNE L. REV. 1349 (1982) (discusses the conflict between the mentally retarded individual's interest in deinstitutionalization and the homeowner's interest in keeping the mentally retarded out
of the community). Recently, the Supreme Court held that the Developmental Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081, does not confer upon the
developmentally disabled any substantive right to "appropriate treatment in the least restrictive
environment." See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S 1, 18 (1981). The
Court reasoned that the Act showed no evidence of intent by Congress to impose on traditional
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ically, the developmentally disabled have been subjected to compulsory
"eugenic" sterilization' and institutionalized' to isolate them and to prevent
them from passing "undesirable" traits to future generations. The developmentally disabled have also been labelled as sub-humans6 and denied
rights and privileges normally afforded to average individuals.'
Within the past two decades, both courts and legislatures have become
inceasingly aware of the problems that confront the developmentally disabled.
The courts have recognized the developmentally disabled individual's right
to equal educational opportunities, 8 treatment, 9 and appropriate community

areas of state sovereignty. Instead, the Court believed that the Bill of Rights provision was intended merely to encourage the states to provide better programs for the developmentally disabled. Id. at 18.
In another recent Supreme Court decision, the Court held that the mentally retarded are
not a "quasi-suspect" class entitled to greater constitutional protection in cases where mentally
retarded individuals alleged violations of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985) (holding
that the challenged legislation allegedly in violation of the equal protection rights of the mentally
retarded need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest). Both the
Pennhurst and Cleburne decisions suggest that the developmentally disabled are not entitled to
special protection from legislation that would interfere with "appropriate treatment" or that
would violate the equal protection clause.
4. Eugenic sterilization refers to sterilization of individuals to prevent them from passing
on "undesirable traits" to future generations. See generally Burgdorf & Burgdorf, The Wicked
Witch is Almost Dead: Buck v. Bell and the Sterilization of Handicapped Persons, 50 TEMP.
L.Q. 995 (1977) (discusses the development of eugenic sterilization and the abuses practiced by
the states under that theory); Kindregran, Sixty Years of Compulsory Sterilization; Three
Generationsof Imbeciles and the Constitution of the United States, 43 Cm.[-]KENr L. REV. 123
(1966) (discusses the abuse of eugenic sterilization).
For examples of the abuse under eugenic sterilization, see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349 (1978) (mildly retarded woman sterilized without her knowledge or consent sued the judge
that authorized the operation); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (state police power authorizes
the state to involuntarily sterilize individuals to prevent them from passing on their "undesirable" traits to future generations).
5. In the past, the developmentally disabled were separated from the rest of society and
placed in institutions that provided little or no training to help their assimilation into society.
See Note, A Review of the Conflict Between Community-Based Group Homes for the Mentally
Retarded and Restrictive Zoning, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 669, 672 (1980).
6. The mentally retarded have often been considered sub-human, eugenic misfits, and
eternal children. See Boyd, The Aftermath of the D.D. Act: Is There Life After Pennhurst?,
40 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 448, 456 (1981); Ross, Sterilization of the Developmentally Disabled Shedding Some Myth-Conceptions, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 580, 599 (1981).
7. See Price & Burt, supra note 3, at 58 (the mentally retarded have been denied the
rights to sexual relations, to marry, to have children, and to proper treatment). See also Shaman,
Person Who Are Mentally Retarded: Their Right to Marry and Have Children, 12 FAM. L.
Q. 61 (1978) (discusses the denial of the rights of the mentally retarded to vote, to marry, and
to have children).
8. See Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania
Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
9. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 390 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom.
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services. 10 Moreover, Congress enacted the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act" in order to afford the developmentally
disabled minimal rights and to encourage the deinstitutionalization of the
developmentally disabled.
In response to these new freedoms afforded the developmentally disabled,
a growing minority of state courts have decided that the incompetent developmentally disabled 2 have the same procreative rights as competent individuals. 3 Consequently, these courts have concluded that the incompetent
developmentally disabled cannot be denied access to a sterilization operation
because sterilization is a form of contraception available to competent individuals.

4

1

Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
In Wyatt, a federal district court held that the mentally handicapped can benefit from,
and have a constitutional right to receive, adequate habilitation. As part of the constitutional
right to habilitation, the court required a showing that admission to the institution was the
least restrictive habilitation available to the mentally retarded person. Id. at 396. The court set
forth several objective standards covering all facets of institutional care, including the hiring
of qualified staff in numbers sufficient to administer treatment and individualized treatment
plans. Id. at 394-95.
Eventually, some of the Wyatt standards were incorporated into the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081. See Halpren, Introduction to Symposium on the Mentally Retarded People and the Law, 31 STAN. L. REV. 545
(1979).
The right of the mentally retarded to receive treatment outside of the institutions has been
in question since the Supreme Court's decision in Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1 (1981), rem'd on state law grounds, 673 F.2d 647 (3rd Cir. 1982), 465 U.S. 89
(1984) (the Court held that the Act does not confer any statutory entitlement to deinstitutionalization).
10. See Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975).
11.42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1975).
12. See supra note 1.
13. See, e.g., In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1981) (incompetent individuals should
not be denied their procreative rights to prevent pregnancy by means of a sterilization operation
just because of their disability); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981) (lack of capacity
for choice should not deprive the incompetent developmentally disabled of the right to procreative choice); In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712 (1982) (adopted guidelines to
provide access by the incompetent developmentally disabled to their procreative right to sterlization); In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980) (en banc) (adopted safeguards
designed to permit access by the developmentally disabled to a sterilization operation). But see
In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981) (any decision regarding the right of
incompetent individuals to be sterilized should come from the legislature and not the courts).
14. Although the United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of
whether sterilization is a constitutional right, the great majority of courts have held that
sterilization is within the constitutional right of privacy. These courts have based their holdings
upon the Supreme Court's decisions in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) and Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (both of which concern a woman's right to an abortion). See In re Moe,
385 Mass. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712 (1982) (nothing that the Supreme Court implicitly recognized
the right of a person to be sterilized as a fundamental right). See also Note, Ruby v. Massey:
Sterilization of the Mentally Retarded, 9 CAP. U.L. REV. 191 (1979) (discusses implicit recogni-
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In Conservatorship of Valerie N.,' 5 the California Supreme Court held
that incompetent developmentally disabled individuals may obtain sterilization operations when they meet strict substantive and procedural guidelines. 6
Unfortunately, the guidelines adopted by the court are not very rigid and
do not afford the incompetent developmentally disabled realistic access to
their newly recognized right.
This Note analyzes the reasoning of the Valerie N. decision, focusing
particularly on the standards adopted by the California Supreme Court in
an attempt to afford the developmentally disabled their fundamental right
to procreative choice. The Note then concludes that the standards do not
promote the developmentally disabled individual's interest in habilitation.

tion of the right to sterilization as a method of birth control).
Not all commentators agree with those state court decisions that allow the incompetent
developmentally disabled to be sterilized. Professors Burt and Price maintain that allowing the
parents or guardians to consent to a sterilization operation for an incompetent individual does
not protect the rights of the incompetent individual. Instead, they argue that third party consent
is a fiction by which the severely disabled are kept from procreating. See Price & Burt, supra
note 3, at 58.
Other commentators fear that incompetent individuals will be sterilized for eugenic reasons
or in the parents' best interests rather than in the best interests of the incompetent individual.
See Sherlock & Sherlock, Sterilizing the Retarded: Constitutional, Statutory and Policy Alternatives, 60 N.C. L. REV. 943, 955 (1982) (when the deprivation of the fundamental right to
procreate is involved, the parents or guardian should not have absolute power to authorize
sterilization).
Some commentators support those state court decisions that adopt standards designed to
allow access to sterilization by incompetent individuals. These commentators argue that the
right to obtain a sterilization operation cannot be denied to the incompetent developmentally
disabled merely because of their incapacity to consent. Instead, they propose that third parties
must be allowed to consent on behalf of the incompetent in order to preserve their fundamental
right to choose sterilization. See Comment, Nonconsensual Sterilization of the Mentally Retarded-Analysis of Standards for Judicial Determinations, 3 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 689 (1981)
(third party consent may be a way to allow the incompetent developmentally disabled access to
sterilization, but it must be carefully applied in order to avoid unnecessary infringement of the
fundamental right to procreate); Comment, Procreation: A Choice for the Mentally Retarded,
23 WASHBURN L.J. 359 (1984) (substituted consent provides the incompetent developmentally
disabled with a means of access to procreative choice) [hereinafter Comment, Procreation].
15. 40 Cal. 3d 143, 707 P.2d 760, 219 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1985) (en banc).
16. Id. at 160, 707 P.2d at 777, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
The Valerie N. majority adopted standards selected from state court decisions providing
the developmentally disabled with access to a sterilization operation. See supra note 14. These
standards provide that the incompetent individual must be represented by an independent
guardian ad litem, and that the proponent of the operation must prove by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence, the need for contraception, the individual's incapacity to consent to the
operation, and the inapplicability of other less intrusive forms of contraception. See Valerie
N., 40 Cal. 3d at 168, 707 P.2d at 777, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 404. In addition, the Valerie N.
majority adopted the requirements of California Probate Code section 2357. Section 2357
governs intrusive medical procedures for individuals incapable of consent in situations where
the operation is medically necessary to preserve the life or health of the incompetent individual.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 2357 (West 1979).
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Finally, this Note evaluates the impact of the decision on the fundamental
due process rights of the developmentally disabled and proposes appropriate
legislation.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A.

Eugenic Sterilization

In the early twentieth century, many people believed in the unproven and

now discredited theory of negative eugenic sterilization.

17

Under this theory,

the mentally ill and the habitual criminal were sterilized in order to prevent

them from passing their undesirable traits to future generations." Negative
eugenic sterilization was based on the assumption that undesirable traits are

17. In the nineteenth century, with the discovery of Mendelian genetics concerning the
relationship between dominant and recessive genes and heredity, many people believed that
through sterilization many of life's most undesirable individuals, including the mentally retarded,
could be eliminated. The theory stated that through the sterilization of those with undesirable
characteristics, those undesirable traits would eventually be eliminated. Sherlock & Sherlock,
supra note 15, at 945.
Eugenic sterilization has not proven to be an effective means of eliminating mental
retardation. The failure of eugenic sterilization can be attributed to the fact that many forms
of mental retardation are not hereditary. The causes of mental retardation can be attributed to
three general classifications; mental retardation that is (1) genetically transmitted; (2) a result
of physical damage or maldevelopment of the brain; and (3) caused by environmental deprivation. See Ross, supra note 6, at 614. See also In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 235-36, 608
P.2d 635, 640 (1980) (en banc) (scientific evidence demonstrates little or no relationship between
genetic inheritance and such conditions as mental retardation, criminal behavior, and diseases
such as epilepsy); North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp.
451, 454 (M.D.N.C. 1976) (most competent geneticists now reject eugenic sterilizaton as a
method to improve the quality of the human race). See generally P. FRIEDMAN, THE RIGHTS OF
MENTALLY RETARDED PERSONS 115-17 (1976) (80-90% of the mentally retarded are born to
normal parents); Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit-Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27 OHIO ST. L.J.
591, 596, 602-604 (1966) (the scientific basis for eugenic sterilization has not proven true, and
the individual's environment may play a bigger role than heredity); Murdock, Sterilization of
the Retarded: A Problem or a Solution?, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 917, 924-28 (1974) (eugenic basis
for sterilization may be overinclusive and it does not account for retardation caused by environment); Myerson, Certain Medical and Legal Phases of Eugenic Sterilization, 52 YALE L.J.
618 (1943) (there are grave weaknesses in the scientific basis for eugenic sterilization and many
diseases once thought to be hereditary have been proven not to be hereditary); Note, Eugenic
Sterilization-A Scientific Analysis, 46 DEN. U.L. REV. 631, 637-47 (1969) (present laws based
on eugenic theory are unsound because they are not a rational means of attaining the governmental purpose asserted as their justification).
18. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (sterilization of the unfit would benefit
the general health and welfare of society). See also Comment, Constitutional Law ...
Sterilization of Defectives, I S. CAL. L. REV. 73 (1927) (discusses the state eugenic sterilization
laws and their treatment in the courts) [hereinafter Comment, Sterilization of Defectives].
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inherited through a simple scheme of dominant and recessive genes, 1 9 and
that certain traits are inherently undesirable.
The development of a relatively safe and simple surgical sterilization

procedure prompted the eugenics movement.2 0 Soon after the procedure was
established, states began to enact compulsory sterilization laws that called

for the sterilization of persons with undesirable traits including mental
retardation." In 1927, the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of
these statutes in Buck v. Bell.Y Buck held that a eugenic sterilization statute
was a valid exercise of state police power 23 and a reasonable procedure that

enhanced the quality of future generations. 24

B. Fundamental Right To Procreative Choice
Just fifteen years after Buck v. Bell, the eugenics movement was set
back by the Supreme Court's decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma. 25 Skinner

ruled that the right to procreate is among those fundamental rights that
trigger more active review under modern interpretations of the equal pro-

tection and due process clauses. 26 In Skinner, the Court struck down a state

19. "Negative eugenic" theory proposes elimination of the unfit by preventing these
individuals from procreating while encouraging the fit to procreate. See Bligh, Sterilization and
Mental Retardation, 51 A.B.A. J. 1059, 1060 (1965). See also Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra
note 4, at 997-99 (the eugenics movement sought to end the "propogation of degeneracy").
20. See In re Cavitt, 182 Neb. 713, 721, 157 N.W.2d 171, 179 (1968) (sterilization of
males and females involves a relatively simple and safe operation); Gray, Compulsory Sterilization In A Free Society: Choices and Dilemmas, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 529, 535 (1972) (the
vasectomy operation on males is an extremely simple operation while the salpingectomy operation on females is slightly more involved).
21. See generally Comment, Sterilization of Defectives, supra note 19 (discusses the
statutes enacted in response to the eugenic sterilization movement, and noted that California
performed 2,558 of the 3,233 total nonvoluntary sterilizations performed in the United States
between 1909 and 1921).
22. 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (Supreme Court upheld a Virginia statute that permitted sterilization of persons believed to suffer from hereditary conditions when the patient and society
would benefit).
23. Id. at 207.
24. Id. Justice Holmes' opinion for the majority analogized compulsory sterilization to
a statute requiring compulsory vaccination upheld in Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905).
In a now famous quote from his majority opinion in Buck, Justice Holmes stated:
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring
for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who
are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. Three
generations of imbeciles are enough.
Id. (citations omitted).
25. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
26. Id. at 541. See also San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34
n.76 (1973) (the right of procreation is among the rights of personal privacy protected under
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involuntary sterilization statute, which included larcenists but excluded em-

bezzlers, as a violation of the equal protection clause. 27 The Court's decision
reflects a heightened sensitivity to the abuses practiced in the field of eugenic
sterilization and establishes the right to procreate as "one of the basic civil

rights of man." ' '
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has held that the right to procreate
is a fundamental right included within the constitutionally protected right of
personal privacy. 29 The right to personal privacy protects decisions made by
married30 and single adults,3 and minors3 2 to obtain contraceptives. In Roe
v. Wade," the Supreme Court also recognized a woman's right to have an
abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy.3 4 In reaching its decision,
the Court stated that the right of privacy encompasses activities relating to

marriage, procreation, contraception, child rearing, family relationships, and
education. 3 A state may not abridge or deny the right to have an abortion

the Constitution); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (right to procreation included within
the right of personal privacy under the penumbras of the first amendment); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1966) (the rights of marriage and procreation are fundamental rights which
trigger heightened scrutiny); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978) 921-23, 1010-11
(dicussing Skinner decision under both the equal protection and due process clauses).
27. 316 U.S. at 541.
28. Id. Justice Douglas' opinion for the majority states:
[T]he power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are inimical
to the dominant group to wither and disappear. There is no redemption for the
individual whom the law touches. Any experiment which the state conducts is to
his irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a basic civil liberty.
Id.
29. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (the Supreme Court held that a statute
prohibiting the use of contraceptives violated the right to privacy under the penumbras of the
first amendment).
30. Id.
31. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (the Court invalidated a statute that permitted
distribution of contraceptives to married but not unmarried persons). Four justices observed
that "[ilf the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id. at 453. Thus, the right
to privacy in procreation was extended to cover an individual's decision as well as a married
couple's decision.
32. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (the decision to bear or beget
a child is at the very heart of constitutionally protected choices).
33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
34. Id. at 163-64. See also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (state may not "unduly
burden" the right of adult and minor women to obtain an abortion).
35. 410 U.S. at 152-53.
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interest may not be
absent a "compelling state interest," 36 and the state
' 37
achieved by "means which are unnecessarily broad.
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the precise question of
whether sterilization is protected under the right of privacy, several courts
have held that the right to choose sterilization is a protected component of

the right to procreative choice.3" Sterilization is viewed by many to be an
accepted method of contraception,3 9 and many courts allow individuals to
be voluntarily sterilized.40 Consequently, it seems likely that the courts will

agree that the right to choose
sterilization as a form of contraception falls
41
within the right of privacy.
C. Substituted Judgment
Because sterilization involves a surgical procedure, 42 the individual's informed consent is a necessary prerequisite to the operation.4 3 Most individuals
36. Id. at 163-64. See also Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S.
416 (1983) (state regulations of the right to obtain an abortion after the first trimester of
pregnancy must be closely drawn to protect the state's compelling interest).
37. 410 U.S. at 155-56. See also Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (1976) (Supreme Court invalidated a provision of a Missouri abortion statute prohibiting
the use of saline amniocentesis method of abortion and prescribing the prostaglandin method).
38. See, e.g., Hathaway v. Worchester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701, 706 (1st Cir. 1973);
Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361, 368 (D. Conn. 1978); Peck v. Califano, 454 F. Supp. 484,
486-87 (C.D. Utah 1977); North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. North Carolina, 420
F. Supp. 451, 454 (M.D.N.C. 1976); Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.C. 1974); In
re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 370 (Colo. 1981) (en banc); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 247, 426 A.2d
467, 473 (1981). See also Jessin v. County of Shasta, 274 Cal. App. 2d 737, 744-45, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 359, 364 (1969) (allowed competent adult to choose sterilization as a method of birth
control).
39. See In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 564, 432 N.E.2d 712, 719 (1982) (right to sterilization
as a method of contraception is protected under the right to personal privacy). See also Gray,
supra note 20, at 533 (increase in the number of voluntary sterilizations as a method of birth
control); Comment, A Woman's Right to Voluntary Sterilization, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 291,
303 (1972) (as a method of birth control, voluntary sterilization falls within the Griswold
decision) [hereinafter Comment, A Woman's Right].
40. See supra note 39.
41. See In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 247, 426 A.2d 467, 473 (1981) (the right to sterilization
is implicit in the Supreme Court's abortion and contraception cases). See also Pilpel, Voluntary
Sterilization: A Human Right, 7 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 105, 116 (1975) (sterilization)

as a method of contraception should be available to all who have the capacity for choice;
proposes legislation to allow greater access to voluntary sterilization); Burnett, Voluntary
Sterilization for Persons with Mental Disabilities,* The Need for Legislation, 32 SYRACUSE L.

REV. 913 (1981) (discusses sterilization rights of incompetents).
42. In females, the surgeon must make an abdominal incision, removing segments of the
fallopian tubes (salpingectomy) and tying the cut ends. In males, the operation involves small
scrotal skin incisions, and segments of the vas defrens are removed (vasectomy). The proximal
ends are then tied. See In re Cavitt, 182 Neb. 713, 721, 157 N.W.2d 171, 179 (1968); S.
& R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 207 (rev. ed. 1971); Comment,
A Womens's Right, supra note 42, at 291.
43. "Informed Consent" is based upon the knowledge and information received from
the physician concerning all pertinent matters including the purpose and nature of the operation,
the irreversibility of the operation, available options, and the potential medical and emotional
BRAKEL
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are capable of informed consent and can obtain the operation. Sterilization,
however, may not be available to those individuals deemed incapable of
informed consent due to mental retardation." In order to protect the fundamental due process rights of those individuals incapable of informed
consent, some courts utilize the doctrine of substituted judgment to achieve
the consent necessary to obtain the operation. 41 Courts are especially likely
to substitute their judgment when sterilization is the only available method
46
of contraception for the individual.
The doctrine of substituted judgment initially developed in cases involving
the disposition of incompetent individuals' estates. 47 In order to effectuate
an individual's intent, courts make a subjective inquiry into what the incompetent individual would do in that particular situation, taking into account

consequences. Absent informed consent, the treating physician could be liable for battery. See
W.

KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 112-18 (5th ed.

1984) (consent avoids liability, but consent may not be effective if the individual is not capable
of informed consent); See generally Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking A Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L.
REV. 413 (the doctrine of informed consent "promotes patient self-determination" in medical
decision-making).
44. See Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1198 (D.D.C. 1974) (minors and the
mentally retarded do not have the capacity for informed consent to sterilization operation). See
generally Neuwirth, Heisler & Goldrich, supra note 1 (not all mentally retarded individuals lack
the capacity for informed consent).
45. See In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 375-76 (Colo. 1981) (en banc); In re Moe, 385 Mass.
555, 565-66, 432 N.E.2d 712, 719 (1982); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 251, 426 A.2d 467, 475
(1981); In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 236-37, 608 P.2d 635, 640-41 (1980) (en banc).
46. Sterilization may be the last and best available method of contraception for an
individual because the extent of the individual's disability may rule out contraception that
requires the individual's conscious participation. For example, the individual may not remember
to take birth control pills everyday and may be unable to insert a diaphragm prior to sexual
intercourse. Thus, the individual may need contraception that is effective but does not require
the individual to consciously remember to utilize it. See Green & Paul, Parenthood and the
Mentally Retarded, 24 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 120 (1974); Comment, Procreation, supra note 14,
at 364.
Moreover, several state decisions addressing the issue of the mentally retarded individual's
right to procreative choice and sterilization have involved mentally retarded females who would
not cooperate in pelvic exams for the placement of an IUD. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 469 So. 2d 588, 590 (Ala. 1985) (Jones, J., dissenting) (incompetent minor would have
to be put to sleep due to her inability to remain still and tolerate the uncomfortable insertion
of an IUD); In re Truesdell, 63 N.C. App. 258, 286, 304 S.E.2d 793, 810 (1983) (mentally
retarded female's extreme fear of pelvic examinations). Thus, in some instances it may be that
other conventional methods of birth control are inapplicable to the severely mentally retarded.
47. See City Bank Co. v. McGowan, 323 U.S. 594, 599 (1944) (the Court was to substitute
itself as nearly as it could for the incompetent individual and to act upon the same motives
and considerations as would have moved the individual). See generally Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 752-53, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (1977) (the
judge's decision should be the same decision the incompetent would make, but taking into
account the present and future incompetency of the individual as one factor).
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the individual's previously expressed desires. 4s The doctrine has been extended
to other personal affairs of incompetent individuals through a series of organ

transplant cases."9 These courts focused on the individual's best interests"0
and attempted to benefit those individuals incapable of making their own
decisions." However, the decisions did not provide many procedural and
52

substantive guidelines.
A further extension of substituted judgment appeared in the New Jersey
Supreme Court's decision of In Re Quinlan.53 The Quinlan court employed
the doctrine of substituted judgment to hold that a comatose patient's right
to privacy includes the decision to consent to the removal of life-support
equipment. 4 The court reasoned that the right to remove the equipment was
a "valuable incident of her right to privacy.""5 Thus, the only way to protect
her rights was to permit Karen Quinlan's guardian and family to render

their best judgment as to whether she would terminate life support under
the circumstances. 5 6 Although the decision was technically made by her
parents, guardian, and medical staff, Karen Quinlan was recognized theoretically as the legal decision-maker. 57

48. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 751,
370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (1977) (the court allowed substituted consent to chemotherapy for an
incompetent individual by examining what the individual would choose to do if competent); In
re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New
Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (the only way to protect the incompetent woman's right to
discontinue life-support was to allow her parents and guardians to choose for her). But see In
re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 376-80, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70-72, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 272-74 (1981) (court
rejected application of substituted judgment); In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 566, 307
N.W.2d 881, 897 (1981) (court rejected substituted judgment in sterilization petition for retarded
woman).
49. See Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969) (court substituted its judgment for
consent to kidney transplant from mentally retarded boy to his brother and focused on the
benefit to the donor in keeping his brother alive). See also In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744 (D.C.
1979) (court utilized substituted judgment to consent to medication for incompetent individual);
In re Schiller, 148 N.J. Super. 168, 372 A.2d 360 (1977) (court substituted its judgment to
consent of an amputation for the incompetent individual). See generally Comment, Spare Parts
From Incompetents: A Problem of Consent, 9 J. FAM. L. 309 (1969) (discussion of cases
utilizing substituted judgment to consent to organ donations).
50. See Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Ky. 1969).
51. Id. at 148. The Strunk court held that in light of the fact that the transplant would
benefit the donor, the court would exercise discretion to substitute its judgment for the benefit
of persons incapable of protecting themselves.
52. Id. at 148-49 (relied exclusively on the determination that the transplant would be in
the incompetent's best interests). See generally Robertson, Organ Donations By Incompetents
and the Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 48, 57-68 (1976) (discusses use of

substituted judgment and standards used in its application).
53. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied sub noma. Garger v. New Jersey, 429
U.S. 922 (1976).
54. Id. at 40, 355 A.2d at 664.
55. Id. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 663-64.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664. See generally Note, The Legal Aspects of the Right
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Despite the absence of legislation authorizing jurisdiction, a growing minority of state courts have utilized substituted judgment to act on petitions
for sterilization of incompetent developmentally disabled individuals.1 8 In
these decisions, the courts have adopted substantive and procedural safeguards that allow the incompetent individual to exercise the right to procreative choice.5 9 At the same time, other state courts have refused to assume
jurisdiction over sterilization petitions. 6° These courts reject substituted judg-

to Die: Before and After the Quinlan Decision, 65 Ky. L.J. 823 (1977) (discussion of substituted
judgment and its application to the Quinlan case). But see Note, Due Process Privacy and the
Path of Progress, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 469, 517-18 (The Quinlan decision represents "a right of

privacy gone wild;" its presumption that an individual would choose to die cuts against human
nature) [hereinafter Note, Due Process Privacy].
58. See In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1981); In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366 (Col.
1981); In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712 (1982); In re Penny N., 120 N.H. 269, 414
A.2d 467 (1981); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981); In re Sallmaier, 85 Misc. 2d
295, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989 (1976); In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980) (en banc).
59. Most of the standards adopted by these courts provide similar determinations of the
individual's incompetency, the need for contraception, and the inapplicability of other contraceptive methods. For example, in In re C.D.M., the Alaska Supreme Court held that the state's
superior courts had jurisdiction to entertain and act upon petitions for sterilization. Moreover,
the court stated that the proponents of the operation bear the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that the operation is in the individual's best interests. The court required
that the incompetent individual be afforded a hearing at which the individual must be represented
by a guardian ad litem.
Next, the court required that the superior court determine that the individual is incompetent
on the basis of comprehensive medical, psychological and social evaluation. Such a finding
requires that the individual in question "lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or
communicate responsible decisions concerning his person."
The court must then determine that there is a need for contraception. The proponent of
the operation must establish that the individual is capable of procreation and unable to
adequately care and provide for her offspring. In addition, the court must examine the
incompetent's physical and psychological ability to deal with pregnancy, and the likely detrimental emotional effects of the sterilization. This determination must be based upon medical
evidence concerning other methods of contraception and why they are impractical for the
incompetent individual. In effect, the proponent of the operation must show the court that
there is no less drastic method of contraception available for the individual.
Finally, the court must examine the incompetent individual and attempt to elicit her views
regarding sterilization and her understanding of the operation and its consequences. Moreover,
the court must examine the proponent's motive in bringing the petition. The court should "give
careful consideration to whether the petition is motivated by genuine concern for the best
interests of the individual rather than concern for the petitioner's own or the public's convenience." Id. at 612-13.
A minority of the courts that allow jurisdiction to authorize sterilization petitions also
require that the operation be "medically necessary." For example, the Colorado Supreme Court
in In re A.W., would only allow sterilization where the operation is medically essential "to
preserve the life or physical or mental health" of the individual. The Massachusetts Supreme
Court in In re Moe, required the state's lower courts to examine the medical necessity for the
operation as one factor in their determination. 385 Mass. 569, 432 N.E.2d 722 (1982).
60. See Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Hudson v. Hudson,
373 So. 2d 310 (Ala. 1979); In re S.C.E., 378 A.2d 144 (Del. Ch. 1977); A.L. v. G.R.H., 163
Ind. App. 636, 325 N.E.2d501 (1975); Holmes v. Powers, 439 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1969); Frazier
v. Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
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ment as a fiction by which the state infringes upon an individual's funda6
mental right to procreate. '
The Washington Supreme Court, in In re Hayes,62 was among the first
state courts to adopt comprehensive standards allowing incompetent individuals access to the right of procreative choice. The Hayes court attempted to
protect the incompetent individual's right to procreative choice by authorizing

the state's superior courts to permit sterilizations. 6 Moreover, the court
established rigid substantive and procedural safeguards 64 to protect against
infringement of the developmentally disabled individual's right to procreate.
The Hayes factors require the proponent of the sterilization to prove by
"clear, cogent, and convincing evidence ' 6 that the individual cannot consent
on his or her own,66 that the operation is in the individual's best interest, 67
and that there is a need for contraception. 68 Finally, the judge must determine

that sterilization is the only available method of contraception for the

individual. 69 Only if all of the required evidence is proven will the court
allow the operation for the individual.
The New Jersey Supreme Court also utilized substituted judgment in
conjunction with the right to procreative choice to enable the incompetent
developmentally disabled access to court-authorized sterilizations. In In re
Grady,70 the New Jersey court included substantive and procedural safeguards
that resemble the standards adopted in In re Hayes. However, the Grady

court's standards also included a factor that takes into account the physical

61. See In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 576-77, 307 N.W.2d 881, 898 (1981) (Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that lower courts had jurisdiction to authorize sterilization, but refused to
allow the exercise of that jurisdiction due to the irreversibility of the operation and the potential
infringement of the fundamental right to procreate).
62. 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980) (en banc).
63. Id. at 234, 608 P.2d at 639.
64. Id. at 234, 608 P.2d at 639-42.
65. Id. at 234, 608 P.2d at 641. The standard of clear and convincing evidence was
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in a case dealing with involuntary civil commitment.
That standard is an intermediate approach utilized when "the interest at stake is more than
mere loss of money." See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979). See also Comment,
Protection of the Mentally Retarded Individual's Right to Choose Sterilization: The Effect of
the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard, 12 CAP. U.L. REV. 413 (1982) (argues that the
clear and convincing evidence standard restricts access to court-authorized sterilization by the
incompetent mentally retarded) [hereinafter Comment, Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard].
66. Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 238, 608 P.2d 635, 641 (1980) (en banc).
67. Id.
68. Id. The proponent of the operation must prove that the individual is capable of
conceiving and that the individual is likely to engage in sexual activity at the present or in the
near future under circumstances likely to result in pregnancy.
69. Id. All other less drastic methods of contraception, including supervision, education,
and training must be prove unworkable or inapplicable by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.
70. 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981).

VALERIE N.

19861

and psychological impact of the operation on the individual. 7' The court
focused on the individual's best interest, but unlike its decision in In Re
Quinlan,72 the Grady court required the ultimate decison to remain with the
court rather than the parents or guardian of the incompetent individual. 73
State court decisions that refuse to consider petitions for sterilization of
the incompetent developmentally disabled assert that substituted judgment
does not adequately protect the individual's right to procreate. 74 Moreover,
they conclude that the doctrine of substituted judgment is subjective and
should not be applied to cases involving individuals who have never had the
7 5
capacity to express desires regarding either sterilization or procreation.
Instead, these courts view objective use of substituted judgment as insufficient protection of the individual's right to procreate.7 6 Rather than assume
jurisdiction, these courts defer to the legislature because of the permanent
nature of the deprivation of the right to procreate that results if sterilization
is allowed.

II.
A.

THE VALERIE N. DECISION

Facts and ProceduralHistory

Responding to a history of abuse in the sterilization of the developmentally
disabled, the California Legislature enacted Probate Code section 2356(d)
in 1979.17 The statute deprived the probate court of jurisdiction over petitions
for the sterilization of incompetent wards and conservatees. 7 At the same

71. Id. at 266, 426 A.2d at 483. In addition, the New Jersey Supreme Court required

the proponents of the operation to demonstrate that they sought the operation in good faith
and that their primary concern was for the best interests of the incompetent person rather than
for their own or the public's convenience.
72. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429

U.S. 922 (1976).
73. In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 264, 426 A.2d 467, 482 (1981). The court stated that "it
was the duty of the court, rather than the parents to determine the need for sterilization." The
fundamental right to procreative choice is an individual right, and the parents' interests might
not be the same as the child's interests.
In addition, the 'court rejected a requirement of "medical necessity" as a factor in the
determination of sterilization petitions. The court stated that "a necessity standard would result
in an unacceptable degree of state interference in the exercise of these rights concerning
sterilization. It may prevent an individual who wishes to be sterilized from being so." Id. at
263 n.9, 426 A.2d at 481 n.9.
74. See supra note 61.
75. In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 578, 307 N.W.2d 881, 893-94 (1981). See also

Price & Burt, supra note 3 (rejects third-party consent as a fiction and argues that strict controls
must be placed on the use of substituted judgment).
76. See In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 576, 307 N.W.2d 881, 893-94 (1981); Hudson
v. Hudson, 373 So. 2d 310, 312 (Ala. 1979).
77. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2356(d) (West 1979).

78. Section 2356(d) provides that "no ward or conservatee may be sterilized under the
provisions of this division." Id. § 2356(d).
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time, the California Legislature repealed Welfare and Institutions Code
section 7254, 79 which authorized sterilization of patients in state institutions. s0
Because of these legislative actions, neither the probate court nor state
hospitals retained authority to permit nontheraputic sterilizations of incompetent wards and conservatees.
Soon after the legislature enacted Probate Code section 2356(d) and repealed section 7254, the parents of Valerie, a severely mentally retarded
twenty-nine year old woman, petitioned the probate court to be appointed
conservators and for "additional powers" to consent to a sterilization operation in her behalf. Valerie suffered from Down's Syndrome,' had an Intelligence Quotient (I.Q.) of thirty," and the functional level of a four year
old. 3 Thus she was incapable of giving informed consent to a sterilization
operations."8
At the probate court hearing, Valerie's mother testified that Valerie was
not sexually active and that she had been closely supervised." However, she
testified that Valerie made inappropriate sexual advances to men" and that
counseling directed to curb her aggressive behavior was ineffective.1 7 She
further testified that Valerie had been given two formulations of birth control
pills in her early teens, but that she had rejected them and had become ill.18
Declarations of Valerie's physicians and her counselor were submitted at
the hearing, and all agreed that the severity of Valerie's mental retardation
meant that no other alternative forms of birth control were available that

79.

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 7254 (repealed 1979).
80. At the time of its repeal section 7254 provided for sterilization of institutionalized
patients. The section afforded an opportunity for judicial review and reflected primarily a
eugenic-based policy. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 7254 (repealed 1979).
81. Down's Syndrome is a chromosome disorder in which the individual's cells contain
forty-seven rather than the normal forty-six chromosomes. The condition usually results in
some degree of mental retardation. See In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 608 n.l (Alaska
1981). Mental retardation is defined as "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that originates during the developmental period and is associated with impairment in adaptive
behavior." See North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp.
451, 453 (M.D.N.C. 1976). See also Haggerty, Kane & Udall, supra note 1, at 64-65 (discusses
the different problems and abilities of mentally retarded individuals with different levels of
retardation).
82. See Mason & Menolascino, The Right to Treatment for Mentally Retarded Citizens:
An Evolving Legal and Scientific Interface, 10 CREIGHTON L. REv. 124, 124 n.l (1976) (under
Weschler I.Q. and Standford-Binet I.Q., an individual with an I.Q. of thirty is severely
retarded). See also In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 608 n.2 (Alaska 1981) (severe mental retardation
is characterized by "retarded speech, language and motor development").
83. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 149, 707 P.2d at 763, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
84. See supra note 45.
85. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 149, 707 P.2d at 763, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
86. Id. Valerie's mother testified at the probate court hearing that Valerie was "aggressive
and affectionate towards boys. On the street she approached men, hugged and kissed them,
climbed on them, and wanted to sit on their laps." Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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would protect against pregnancy. s9 Moreover, all three declarants agreed that

a pregnancy would cause "psychiatric harm" to Valerie 9 and that sterilization was "advisable and medically appropriate" in her case. 91 Her counselor further stated that close monitoring had severely hampered Valerie's
92
ability to form social relationships.

Valerie's appointed counsel did not offer any evidence at the hearing, but
argued that less drastic alternatives to sterilization should be used. 93 He also

asserted that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to authorize the operation.
No evidence was presented at the hearing to show whether or not less
intrusive means of birth control were available, and no evidence was pre94
sented to show that .Valerie was capable of conceiving.

The probate court agreed that a tubal ligation operation was medically
safe and would enhance the quality of Valerie's life, and that Probate Code
section 2356(d) was unconstitutional. 95 The court reasoned, however, that it

was obligated to follow precedent holding that the probate court lacks
jurisdiction to authorize the sterilization of wards and conservatees and
therefore denied the petition. 96 The trial court judgment was affirmed on

appeal, and Valerie's conservators appealed to the California Supreme Court.
B.

The California Supreme Court's Rationale

In Conservatorship of Valerie N., the California Supreme Court struck
down Probate Code section 2356(d) and adopted substantive and procedural
safeguards to allow the probate court the power to authorize sterilizations
of wards and conservatees. 97 The court reasoned that the Probate Code
section prohibiting sterilization of incompetent developmentally disabled

89. Id. "Valerie was unable to apply other methods of birth control such as a diaphragm,
and would not cooperate in a pelvic examination for an intrauterine device." Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 147, 707 P.2d at 764, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. The probate court reasoned that California appellate court decisions in Guardianship
of Tully, 83 Cal. App. 3d 698, 146 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1978) and Guardianship of Kemp, 43 Cal.
App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974) denied probate court jurisdiction over petitions for
sterilization of wards or conservatees in the absence of statutory authority. These decisions
stated that a probate court was a court of limited jurisdiction and that in the absence of
statutory authority, it lacked jurisdiction to order the involuntary sterilization of a severely
impaired ward or conservatee. Moreover, the courts focused on the fact that sterilization is an
extreme remedy that permanently deprives the individual of the ability to procreate. But see
Maxon v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 3d 626, 633-34, 185 Cal. Rptr. 516, 520-21 (1982)
(court held that Probate Code section 2356(d) does not prohibit a hysterectomy where the
incompetent woman has an 80076 risk of cervical cancer without the operation, even though the
operation renders the woman sterile).
97. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 158-61, 707 P.2d at 775-78, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 402-05.
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individuals denied those individuals their fundamental right to procreative
choice98 and held that the probate court did have jurisdiction to consider
the petition for sterilization. 99 The court, however, denied authority to
perform a sterilization on Valerie because there was insufficient evidence to
allow the operation under the substantive and procedural framework.1'°

To reach its decision, the majority examined the constitutional rights of
the incompetent developmentally disabled and found that Valerie had a

right to have basic decisions made for her by her conservators.' 0' The majority
reasoned that the incompetent developmentally disabled have a right to
personal growth and development that is implicit in Roe v. Wade'0 2 and

Allgeyer v. Louisiana.03 Thus, the court determined that the right to
"habilitation"'0 4 is a constitutionally protected right under the United States'05
98. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
99. Valerie N., at 160, 707 P.2d at 777, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
100. Id. The majority stated that there was no evidence presented to show that Valerie
was capable of conceiving, nor was there evidence that other less intrusive means of contraception
were unavailable to Valerie. However, the court affirmed the probate court judgment without
prejudice to a renewed application for additional powers.
101. Id.
102. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). In Roe, the United States Supreme Court stated that the
right obtain an abortion stems from the problems a woman would face if she were not able to
obtain an abortion; "maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon a woman a distressful
life and future." Id.
103. 165 U.S. 579, 589 (1897). In Allgeyer, the United States Supreme Court held that an
individual must be free in the use of all his faculties and must be allowed to use them in any
lawful way. See also Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954) (individual liberty cannot
be restricted except for a proper governmental objective); Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630, 636
(1914) (free to pursue life in any lawful calling).
104. The court examined state and federal efforts to afford the developmentally disabled
constitutional rights, services and training. California's Lanterman Developmental Disabilities
Services Act establishes state regional centers for the developmentally disabled that provide
training and other services. See Myers, Cvitanov & Lippman, Legislative Evolution of a StateWide Services System: California's Regional Centers for Developmentally Disabled Persons, 14
RUTGERS L.J. 653 (1983). See also Kay, Farnham, Karren, Knakal & Diamond, Legal Planning
CALIF. L. REV. 438 (1972) (discusses
the Lanterman Act and its impact on guardianship, involuntary commitment and state-wide
services for the retarded).
In addition, the court examined the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6010(l) and (2). This federal Act includes within its provisions the
right to "treatment, services, and habilitation for a person with developmental disabilities."
The Act states that habilitation "should be designed to maximize the developmental potential
of the person and should be provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the person's
personal liberty." Id. The United States Supreme Court in Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), stated that "habilitation ...consists of education and training
for those, such as the mentally retarded, who are not mentally ill." Id. at 7 n.2. However, the
court held that the bill of rights provision of the Developmental Disabilities Act does not create
any substantive rights to "appropriate treatment" in the "least restrictive environment."
After examining the legislation, the Valerie N. court concluded that neither Act provided
a source of authority under which to allow court-authorization of sterilization of the developmentally disabled. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 155, 707 P,2d at 771, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 398.

for the Mentally Retarded: The California Experience, 60

105. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 157, 707 P.2d at 773, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 400.
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and California' ° Constitutions.
Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet recognized a
fundamental right to sterilization as a method of contraception, 07 the majority concluded that the interests of the incompetent developmentally disabled required recognition of fundamental due process rights on the same
basis as women competent to give consent. 0 8 Because competent women
could choose sterilization as a method of contraception in California,' °9 the
majority reasoned that incompetent developmentally disabled women should
not be denied this right simply because of their disability." 0 The majority
then subjected Probate Code section 2356(d) to strict scrutiny"' analysis and
determined that the state's interest in protecting the procreative rights of the
incompetent developmentally disabled did not justify the prohibition on all
nontheraputic sterilizations of wards and conservatees." 2
In rejecting the argument that the past abuse of eugenic sterilization
mandated the prohibition on court-authorized sterilizations of wards and
conservatees, the majority stated that "less restrictive alternatives" to total
prohibition were available in statutory and procedural safeguards "as yet
untried in California."" 3 These statutory safeguards included Probate Code
section 2357" 4 and the standards that the Washington Supreme Court adopted
in In Re Hayes."15

106. Id. at 162-63, 707 P.2d at 773, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 400. Article One, section one of
the California Constitution provides that "all people are by nature free and independent and
have inalienable rights. Among these are: enjoying and defending life and liberty, aquiring,
possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness and privacy." Id.
107. But see supra note 40 (state and federal court decisions finding a constitutional right
to voluntary sterilization).
108. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 161, 707 P.2d at 772, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
109. California has recognized the right of individuals to choose sterilization as a method
of contraception under the right to personal privacy. See Committee to Defend Reproductive
Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 263, 625 P.2d 779, 784, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 871 (1981)
(constitutional right of women to exercise procreative choice "as they see fit"); Jessin v. County
of Shasta, 274 Cal. App. 2d 737, 748, 79 Cal. Rptr. 359, 366 (1969).
110. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 161, 707 P.2d at 754, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 399. Accord In re
C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 612 (Alaska 1981); In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 564-65, 432 N.E.2d 712,
719 (1982); In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 237, 608 P.2d 635, 640 (1980) (en banc).
Ill. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973) (fundamental right to procreative
choice received the greatest constitutional protection and infringement by the state upon these
rights triggers strict judicial scrutiny).
112. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 161, 707 P.2d at 772, 219 Cal Rptr. at 399.
113. Id. at 165, 707 P.2d at 774-75, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
114. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2357 (West 1979). This sections governs consent to intrusive
medical procedures for those wards and conservatees unable to give consent.
The Law Revision Commission comment to the section states, "Section 2357 provides for
notice to interested persons, for the appointment of counsel to represent the ward or conservatee
where necessary, for the presentation to the court of medical affidavits showing the need for
the medical treatment, and for findings by the court before an order authorizing the treatment
is made." CAL. PROB. CODE § 2357 (West 1979) (Law Revision Commission Comment).
115. 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980) (en banc). The Hayes case concerned a peti-
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Under the Hayes factors, inability to consent must be established by "clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence" that the individual is incapable of making
a decision about sterilization and is unlikely to develop sufficiently to make
an informed judgment about sterilization in the foreseeable future." 6 The
determination can only be made in a court proceeding in which the incompetent is represented by a disinterested guardian ad litem." 7 The court must

receive independent advice based on comprehensive medical, psychological,
and social evaluations of the individual, and to the greatest extent possible

the court must elicit and take into account the views of the incompetent
individual.118 The proponent of the operation must present clear, cogent,

and convincing evidence that the operation is in the best interest of the
incompetent individual." 9 The court must also take into account the age and
educability of the individual, the likelihood of the individual bearing a

retarded child, the individual's potential as a parent, and the availability of
20
other less restrictive means of contraception for the individual.°
In addition, the court must find that the individual is physically capable
of procreating and likely to engage in sexual activity at the present, or in
the near future, under circumstances likely to result in pregnancy.'' Furthermore, the court must find that the nature and extent of the individual's

disability as determined by empirical evidence and not solely on the basis of
standardized tests, renders the individual permanently incapable of caring
for a child, even with reasonable assistance.'
Finally, there must be no less restrictive alternative to sterilization. All
contraceptive methods, including supervision, education, and training must
be proven unworkable or inapplicable, and sterilization must entail the least

tion for sterilization brought by the parents of a severely retarded sixteen year old girl. The
Washington Supreme Court held that the state's superior courts had jurisdiction to consider
the petition. Moreover, the court adopted guidelines in an effort to protect against abuse and
to guide the lower courts in ruling on the petitions.
116. Id. at 235, 608 P.2d at 641.
117. Id. The court did not define the guardian ad litem's role in the proceedings, but
other decisions have stated that the guardian has the authority to present proof and cross
examine witnesses. See In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 612 (Alaska 1981); In re Grady, 85 N.J.
235, 266, 426 A.2d 467, 482-83 (1981).
118. Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d at 235, 608 P.2d at 641.
119. Id. The Hayes court stated that unlike the situation involved in a normal medical
procedure, the interests of the parents may not be the best interests of the child. For that
reason, the court chose to analyze whether the operation is truly in the child's best interests.
Id. See also Comment, Sterilization, Retardation and Parental Authority, 1973 B.Y.U. L. REV.
380, 393 (parents' interest in child's welfare is not always present when the child is mentally
retarded; conflict is due to the fear of illegitimate retarded offspring and retarded grandchildren).
120. Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d at 234, 608 P.2d at 640.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 235, 608 P.2d at 641.
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invasion of the body of the individual. 123 The court must then determine by
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the current state of scientific and
medical knowledge does not suggest that either a reversible sterilization
procedure or other less drastic method of contraception will shortly be
the threshold of an advance in the treatment
available, or that science is on
124
of the individual's disability.
In addition to the Hayes factors, the Valerie N. majority adopted the
requirements of Probate Code section 2357, 125 governing approval of intrusive
medical procedures. The court reasoned that application of section 2357
would insure that the consevatee would receive independent representation
and that "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence of the necessity for the
procedure would be introduced by the applicant as a prerequisite to judicial
26
approval."
In Conservatorship of Valerie N., the majority concluded that there was
insufficient information in the record to authorize a petition for sterilization
under the Hayes factors and section 2357. 21 The record contained no evidence
of Valerie's capacity to conceive, whether less intrusive means were available
as contraception, or whether the "course of treatment" was necessary under
section 2357.
C.

The Concurring and Dissenting Opinions

All seven justices concurred in the denial of authority to sterilize Valerie.
Three justices, however, dissented from the majority's decision to rule
Probate Code section 2357(d) unconstitutional and to adopt a substantive
and procedural framework. Justices Reynoso and Lucas filed opinions in
which they criticized the majority's decision to declare section 2356(d) unconstitutional in view of the history of abuse practiced under compulsory
eugenic sterilization statutes.128 Moreover, Justice Lucas rejected the majority's decision to substitute the court's judgment for the incompetent developmentally disabled individual. 2 9 He believed that the majority's decision
overemphasized the parents' desires and did not adequately protect the
incompetent individual from abuse.
Chief Justice Bird dissented from the majority on two grounds: the
majority's treatment of the fundamental right to procreate and its use of
the doctrine of substituted judgment. Because of the past abuse present

123. Id.
124. Id. at 236, 608 P.2d at 642.
125. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2357 (West 1979).
126. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 161, 707 P.2d at 777, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
127. Id. at 161-62, 707 P.2d at 777-78, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 404-05. The court stated that
there was neither a finding that sterilization was required nor evidence to support that finding.
128. Id. at 161, 707 P.2d at 777-78, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 405 (Reynoso, J., concurring and
dissenting); Id. at 143, 707 P.2d at 781, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 408 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 164, 707 P.2d at 781, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 407 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
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under compulsory sterilization statutes, the Chief Justice reasoned that section 2356(d) was necessary to discontinue the practice of state-authorized
sterilization of the developmentally disabled. 30 Moreover, she believed that
the history of involuntary sterilization was the "frame of reference for
evaluating the constitutionality of the legislature's ban on sterilization" of
incompetent conservatees, 3 ' as well as the framework adopted by the ma32
jority from the Hayes decision.'
The Chief Justice rejected the majority's assertion that the right to procreative choice was paramount to the right to procreate.'
Rather, she
believed that the right to procreate is a basic civil liberty "that goes deeper
than, and does not depend upon, rational choice."'13 4 In addition, Chief
Justice Bird argued that the right to procreative choice concerning birth
control and abortion could not be applied to incompetent developmentally
disabled individuals since it creates "a false impression of equivalence between the 'decision' to procreate and the 'decision' to be sterilized."'' She
argued that the right to be sterilized depends upon the exercise of rational
or knowing choice, but the right to procreate includes the right to retain
physical integrity and biological capabilities. 3 6 On the question of substituted judgment, the Chief Justice criticized the majority's application of that
doctrine to cases that involve an irreversible sterilization operation. Instead
of allowing the incompetent developmentally disabled an opportunity to
exercise their constitutional right to procreative choice, the Chief Justice
believed that substituted judgment provided the means by which the state
infringes upon the fundamental right to procreate.1 37 In effect, she believed
that substituted judgment under the Hayes factors adopted by the majority
was inconsistent with the notion that the choice being made is the one that
the conservatee would have made 3 ' and that the Hayes factors and section

130. Id. at 144, 707 P.2d at 782, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 408 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. The Chief Justice asserted that the right to procreate also included the right to bodily
autonomy. See Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1891) (common law
right to be free from compulsory physical examination). However, the dissent does not acknowledge cases in which the right to procreative choice was held to be paramount to the right
to procreate. For example, various United States Supreme Court decisions allow minor's
decisions concerning contraception and abortion to override the parents' wishes under certain
circumstances. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976).
See also Hathaway v. Worchester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973) (woman's decision
on sterilization paramount to husband's desires).
134. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 169, 707 P.2d at 785, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 412 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
135. Id. at 170, 707 P.2d at 786, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 413, (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 175, 707 P.2d at 791, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 418. See also Burt & Price, supra note
3 (third-party consent "is a fiction which authorizes the state to intervene because a party other
than the subject provides the green light").
138. Id.
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2357 were inconsistent with the majority's concern for the habilitation of
1 39
the developmentally disabled.

III.

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

Because the Valerie N. majority provided some access to the fundamental
right of procreative choice, the standards established by the court are preferable to a total prohibition on access to court-authorized sterilization.'However, there are several problems with the majority's analysis and standards that remain unresolved. Habilitation connotes both the developmentally
disabled individual's right to maximize his or her potential'' and the right
to be free in the enjoyment of all of his or her faculties. 142 However, the
majority's standards contradict the apparent concern for the incompetent
developmentally disabled individual's right to habilitation, and it does not
provide adequate guidance to the probate court judge who must apply the
standards.
Although the majority does provide a forum for the incompetent developmentally disabled to assert their right to procreative choice, the court's
standards do not provide a realistic opportunity for those individuals to
exercise their rights. Most problematic is the majority's decision to adopt
Probate Code section 2357 as a threshold standard that must be met prior
to analysis under the Hayes factors.1 43 Probate Code section 2357 allows

139. Id. at 176, 707 P.2d at 792, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 419. Chief Justice Bird stated that the
Hayes factor requiring that all less intrusive means of contraception including supervision be
ruled inapplicable was not consistent with the majority's position that Valerie has a liberty
interest in being sterilized in order to be free of parental supervision.
140. See In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 564-65, 432 N.E.2d 712, 720 (1982) (inability of an
incompetent mentally retarded individual to choose sterilization should not result in a loss of
the person's constitutional interests); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 272-73, 426 A.2d 467, 480-81
(1981) (allowing substituted judgment produces a more compassionate result than leaving the
incompetent individual without a choice). But see In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 566, 307
N.W.2d 881, 893 (1981) (substituted judgment results in state intrusion into whether or not an
individual will be allowed the opportunity to procreate).
141. See supra note 105.
142. See supra note 106.
143. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 161, 707 P.2d at 777, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 402. The court
stated that "pending action by the legislature to establish criteria and procedural protections
governing these applications, the procedures governing approval of intrusive medical procedures
set forth in section 2357 should be adapted and applied." Id. However, the majority never
stated how section 2357 was to be "adapted and applied" to situations involving nontheraputic
sterilization operations. Thus, the majority implicitly adopted a "medical necessity" threshold
standard that the proponent must meet prior to analysis under the Hayes standards and "any
other relevant factors brought to the attention of the court by the parties." Of the other state
courts that have adopted standards to allow the mentally retarded access to the right to
procreative choice, only one has adopted a medical necessity threshold requirement. See In re
A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 375 (Colo. 1981) (Colorado Supreme Court adopting standards that allow
for sterilization of an incompetent individual only upon a finding that the operation is "medically
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access to probate court review whenever "the existing or continuing medical
condition of the ward or conservatee requires the recommended course of
treatment."'4 In Conservatorship of Valerie N., Valerie's conservators sought
the authority to use a nontheraputic sterilization and neither Valerie's life
nor health were in jeopardy.1 45 Valerie's conservators sought probate court
authorization because sterilization is an irreversible method of contraception.1 46 The majority held that there was no evidence to show that sterilization
was "required" or even "necessary"' 4 ' and that the conservators had not
met the threshold requirement of section 2357.148 The majority, however,
ignored evidence presented in the declarations of Valerie's personal physicians
and her counselor that pregnancy and childbirth would cause Valerie "severe
psychiatric damage." 149
As a result of the majority's narrow reading of section 2357, the probate
court forum is potentially inaccessible, even where there is evidence that the
individual could be harmed if not treated.' 50 Although this interpretation

essential" to preserve the life or physical health of the individual).
Other state courts have criticized the medical necessity requirement adopted in In re A.W.
as too restrictive of access to court-authorized sterilization. See In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 261,
426 A.2d 467, 481 (1981) (New Jersey Supreme Court explicitly rejected a medical necessity
requirement because it believed such a requirement would unduly restrict access to sterilization
by those individuals unable to choose sterilization). See also In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 569
n.10, 432 N.E.2d 712, 722 n.10 (1982) (Massachusetts Supreme Court adopted a medical
necessity factor, but it was only one of several factors under its analysis).
144. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2357 (West 1979).
145. However, the declarations of the physician and child counselor were in agreement
that pregnancy and childbirth would cause "severe psychiatric harm" to Valerie. See Valerie N.,
40 Cal. 3d at 146, 707 P.2d at 763, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
146. Id. at 146, 707 P.2d at 763, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 390. Valerie's doctor recommended a
tubal ligation after Valerie rejected birth control pills.
147. Id. at 160, 707 P.2d at 777-78, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
148. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
149. The court's apparent rejection of "severe psychiatric harm" would seem to mean
that the Valerie N. medical necessity requirement is even more stringent than the requirement
adopted in In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1981).. In the In re A.W. case, the medical necessity
requirement was held to provide access to sterilizations where the proponent of the operation
presented evidence that pregnancy would threaten the individual's physical or mental health,
and where there were no less intrusive forms of contraception which would be safe and effective.
Because the Valerie N. majority rejects psychiatric harm as sufficient to meet the medical
necessity standard, the Valerie N. standard is even more restrictive of access to court-authorized
sterilization. In effect, it gives the mentally retarded conservatee the right to procreative choice
with one hand, but takes it away with the other hand by imposing a stringent requirement that
very few individuals will be able to meet. See In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 569 n.10, 432 N.W.2d
712, 722 n.10 (1982) (requiring a high burden of proof of medical necessity would defeat the
purpose of the proceedings); In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 242, 608 P.2d 635, 643 (Stafford,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stringent standards defeat the purpose behind the
proceedings and take away the "forum" for the incompetent to exercise their procreative rights).
150. By rejecting psychiatric harm, the Valerie N. majority would apparently require some
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence of physical harm before it would analyze the case under
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represents a substantial barrier to court-authorized sterilization,' the court's
has not been accepted by
narrow reading of the medical necessity standard
15 2
the other courts that have addressed the issue.
If under section 2357 a sterilization is determined to be required or
neccessary, the probate court judge must then analyze the facts under the
Hayes factors.'5 Several of the Hayes factors, however, contradict the
majority's emphasis on the individual's right to habilitation. One Hayes
factor requires the probate judge to find by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence, that "all less drastic alternatives to sterilization, including supervision ...have proven unworkable or inapplicable."' 154 This factor places a
high burden on the proponent of the operation' 5 and unnecessarily interferes
with access to sterilization, 5 6 even in cases where sterilization is in the
individual's best interest and would promote personal development. As a
method of contraception, supervision can protect against unwanted pregnancy, 5" but it does so at a high cost to the incompetent individual's liberty
In effect, the court incorrectly ignored the main
and privacy interests.'

the Hayes standards. The Court's narrow reading of "harm" under section 2357, in conjunction
with the clear, cogent, and convincing evidence standard, unnecessarily creates a high barrier
to access to a court-authorized sterilization. See Comment, Clear and Convincing Evidence
Standard, supra note 66, at 433-34 (medical necessity requirements are designed to protect
against abuse, but the practical effect is to foreclose the right to choose not to procreate).
151. See supra note 150.

152. See Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., 293 Md. 685, 723, 447 A.2d 1244, 1263
(1982) (Donaldson, J., dissenting) (medical necessity requirement forces the lower court to place
primary emphasis on single objective factor irrespective of the decision the incompetent individual would make if competent; requirement affords the individual's physician an absolute
veto over access to court-authorized sterilization). See also Comment, Clear and Convinving
Evidence Standard, supra note 66, at 433-34.
153. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 160, 707 P.2d at 777, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 404. The probate

court may also consider "any other relevant factors brought to the court's attention." Id. It
is not impossible that the "other factors" could include information on the benefit to the
parents and society in sterilizing the incompetent or other eugenically-based rationale. The
eugenic basis for sterilization is clearly not in the individual's best interests.
154. See Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d at 238-39, 608 P.2d at 641.
155. Comment, Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard, supra note 66, at 431-32 (clear
and convincing evidence standard forecloses access to the right to obtain a "best interest"

sterilization).
156. Id. at 433-34 (The state supreme court decisions in Hayes, Grady, In re A. W., and
other cases do provide a forum for the mentally retarded. However, they do not provide

realistic access to the right to choose not to procreate).
157. See Green & Paul, supra note 46, at 120 (mentally retarded individuals require
contraception that does not require their conscious participation). If the mentally retarded are
isolated from members of the opposite sex or supervised to make sure they take their birth
control pills everyday, then the risk of pregnancy should be reduced.
158. The potential cost involved to the incompetent conservatee is that the standard, in
combination with the clear, cogent, and convincing evidence requirement, could effectively
foreclose sterilization to those individuals who would benefit most from greater freedom.
Without any access to sterilization, and without the ability to utilize other forms of contracep-
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reason Valerie's conservators sought a court-authorized sterilization.' 5 9 Valerie's conservators wanted to allow Valerie more freedom to develop socially' 60
without the need for constant supervision.1 61 Consequently, if this Hayes
factor is narrowly construed, incompetent individuals will be denied access
to sterilizations that would allow them to participate in services and activities
62
that do not provide for close supervision.
Another defect in the court's decision is its failure to consider any physical
and psychological harm that could result from the sterilization operation. It
is anomalous to consider the physical impact of pregnancy and childbirth
on the conservatee under section 2357, and then specifically ignore consideration of the psychological harm that could result from the sterilization
operation itself. 63 The once popular view that the developmentally disabled
do not care that they are sterilized has been severely criticized and dis-

tion, the individual may be subjected to continued isolation from other individuals. That
isolation does not promote the individual's ability to participate in services and programs
provided for the mentally retarded. Consequently, the individual may be denied their liberty
and freedom because supervision has proven to be an effective method of "contraception" in
the past. See Comment, Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard, supra note 66, at 432.
159. Conservators have sought court-authorized sterilization on similar grounds in other
cases. See, e.g., In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 367-68 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) (parents of mentally disabled woman were concerned that the girl's overnight trips with her school afforded
opportunities for sexual activity; parents also concerned that girl's monthly periods brought
her "a considerable degree of fright, fear, and a general feeling of unrest"); In re Moe, 385
Mass. 554, 555 n.1, 432 N.E.2d 712, 715 n.l (1982) (severely retarded, institutionalized woman
had previously suffered a "sexual incident" and was unable to effectively practice any other
medically recognized method of birth control); In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 230, 608 P.2d
635, 636 (1980) (en banc) (sexually active severely retarded woman was unable to understand
her own reproductive functions. Her physicians believed that long term methods of contraception
other than sterilization could be harmful to her).
160. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 146, 707 P.2d at 763, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
161. Her parents stated that they planned to continue caring for Valerie at home, but
their long range plan was to place Valerie in a residential home should they became mentally
or physically unable to care for her. Valerie's counselor stated in her declaration that close
monitoring of Valerie to avoid pregnancy "had severely hampered Valerie's ability to form
social relationships." Id. at 146, 707 P.2d at 763, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
162. For example, any overnight trips would be foreclosed to individuals in Valerie's
situation that require constant supervision when with members of the opposite sex. See In re
A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 367-68 (Colo. 1981). Moreover, any controlled housing situation for the
mentally retarded could be foreclosed to individuals denied access to sterilization where conventional contraceptive measures are unworkable or inapplicable. See In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d
607 (Alaska 1981).
163. The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 262, 426
A.2d 467, 483 (1981), adopted such a standard rather than a medical necessity standard. Because
the Valerie N. majority apparently reads "psychiatric harm" out of the requirements of section
2357, the court should have included some recognition that it is the developmentally disabled
conservatee that may become pregnant or have the sterilization operation. Even though the
court's opinion leaves open the possibility that the parties could bring this information to the
court's attention, it would have been preferable to have specifically included that standard.
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proven.' 64 The majority should have included a factor specifically addressing
the psychological impact of a sterilization operation on the incompetent
individual. Failure to include that factor disregards the full consideration of
the individual's "best interests" that should be made where infringement of
65
the fundamental right to procreate is possible.
In the court's analysis of the fundamental right to procreative choice, the
majority held that a ward or conservatee's inability to consent should not
result in a forfeiture of fundamental due process rights, 66 nor of the effective
protection of his or her "best interests."'' 67 The majority reasoned that to
preserve the right to procreative choice and the benefits that a meaningful
decision would bring to the ward or conservatee, it may be necessary to
assert that right on the ward or conservatee's behalf.16 1In reaching a decision,
however, the majority did not adequately address the problems inherent in
the application of substituted judgment in cases involving the sterilization
69
of developmentally disabled individuals.

164. The fallacy of the opinion reflected in Buck v. Bell was revealed by several psychological studies. See Ross, supra note 6, at 621-22 (discusses results of psychological studies by
Sabagh and Edgerton revealed in Sterilized Mental Defectives Look at Eugenic Sterilization, 9
EUGENICS Q. 215-16 (1962)). See also Ross, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded: An Overview, 1 LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY REV. 151 (1975) (discussion of study results of incompetent individuals sterilized prior to release from state institutions and their feelings about being involuntarily sterilized).
165. See Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d at 234, 608 P.2d at 639 (sterilization touches upon the
individual's right to privacy and the right to procreate and, because it is an irreversible procedure,
should be undertaken only after careful consideration of all relevant factors).
166. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 146-47, 707 P.2d at 773-74, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 400-01.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 150, 707 P.2d at 777, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
169. As it was originally developed, the doctrine of substituted judgment involved the
court in a subjective inquiry in which the court was to "don the mental mantle of the
incompetent." In re Carson, 39 Misc. 2d 544, 545, 271 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1962).
However, where the court is asked to substitute its judgment for an individual who has
been incompetent since birth, the court has no basis for a subjective inquiry and must interject
objective analysis into, the test. See In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 376-80, 420 N.E.2d 64, 7072, 148 N.Y.S.2d 266, 272-74 (1981). See also Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 752-53, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (1977) (court rejected an objective
"reasonable person" test and utilized substituted judgment to consent to chemotherapy for an
incompetent individual).
Cases involving petitions for sterilization also present a problem in that substituted
judgment must be made on the basis of objective factors rather than the incompetent individual's
previously expressed desires and beliefs. See In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 565, 432 N.E.2d 712,
720 (1982) (court utilized substituted judgment to produce "a more just and compassionate
result" than total prohibition of all sterilizations for the incompetent mentally retarded).
Not all the courts that have considered the issue agree that substituted judgment should
be applied to situations involving nonvoluntary sterilization of the retarded. See In re Eberhardy,
102 Wis. 2d 539, 566, 307 N.W.2d 881, 893 (1981) (court rejected substituted judgment and
stated that the "choice" involved in the decision to be sterilized under substituted judgment
"clearly is not a personal choice, and no amount of legal legerdemain can make it so").
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By allowing probate court judges to consent for the incompetent individual,
7
1 and Grady,'72 all
the majority followed the decisions in Hayes, 70 Quinlan,1
of which blur the distinction between objective and subjective use of sub-

stituted judgment.17 Application of substituted judgment to a case involving
an individual who has never had the capacity to express any desires regarding
procreation or sterilization does not adequately address the special problems

and desires of the incompetent individual.' 74 Instead, it involves the court in
an objective inquiry into what a reasonable person would do under the
circumstances. 17 Thus the probate judge's decision would not represent the

best interests of the individual, but rather, the best interests of the average
developmentally disabled individual under the circumstances. The irreversi-

the court against ruling in favor
bility of a mistaken decision should caution
176

of sterilization under the objective test.
Although substituted judgment provides the developmentally disabled with
a "choice," the majority fails to address the fact that the choice is made

by a probate court judge under the Hayes framework.' Supreme Court
decisions in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 78 Roe v. Wade, 179 and other cases'8 °
establish that the government cannot intrude in decisions regarding the choice
of whether to bear children absent a compelling state interest.' 8 The majority
did not require a compelling state interest in providing access to sterilization

for incompetent developmentally disabled wards or conservatees. The majority's failure to take this extra step effectively abrogates the fundamental
nature of the right to procreate as a "basic civil right of man,"'8

2

and does

not adequately account for the developmentally disabled's right to bodily
integrity. 183

170. In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980) (en banc).
171. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Granger v.
New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
172. In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981).
173. See supra note 170.
174. See Sherlock & Sherlock, supra note 15, at 965 (objective use of substituted judgment
turns the inquiry into a "reasonable person" test that is not adequately protective of the
retarded individual's rights and interests).
175. Id.
176. See In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 578, 307 N.W.2d 881, 899 (1981) (sterilization
is irreversible, and the judicial process could afford no method for correcting an error in the
exercise of its discretion).
177. The probate court judge must hear the evidence and determine whether the proponent
of the operation has met the clear and convincing evidence standard under the Hayes factors.
If the proponent of the operation meets the burden of proof then authorization for the operation
also comes from the court.
178. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
179. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
180. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
181. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-55 (1973).
182. See supra note 25.
183. See Note, Due Process Privacy, supra note 57, at 515 (right to personal privacy is
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Although other state supreme courts have adopted common law standards
to allow access to the right to procreative choice, the decision in Valerie N.
is novel in that the court ignored the question of probate court jurisdiction.
In addition to Hayes'1 4 and Grady, 181 many decisions expressly address the
question of jurisdiction.8 6 The court's power to order nonvoluntary sterilization is not as clear as the majority's opinion would suggest. A number of
state court decisions have precluded judicial action absent statutory authority,
and those cases that allow judicial action do so in the absence of statutory
authority to the contrary. 7 However, the Valerie N. majority was confronted
with both a state statute expressly denying jurisdiction, 8s as well as appellate
court precedent directly opposed to probate court authority to order sterilization. Consequently, since the court failed to address the question of
jurisdiction, the majority implicitly accepted the rationale of those state court
decisions which approve jurisdiction. However, they did so without adequately analyzing or distinquishing the rationale of other state court decisions
which have held that the legislature is better able to address the interests
involved in this confrontation of fundamental rights.8 9 Legislative enactment of Probate Code section 2356(d) together with the repeal of Welfare
and Institutions Code section 7254 clearly demonstrate the legislature's intent
to restrict probate court jurisdiction.190 In light of the irreversibility of a
sterilization operation, the majority moved too quickly in discounting the
legislature's decision to end nonvoluntary sterilization in California. Instead,
the court should have addressed the controversy involved in the jurisdiction
issue. However, it is not unrealistic to assume that the legislature believed
that the opportunity for discretion in the determination of the indivdiual's

based on the individual's interest in bodily autonomy). See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453 (1972) (right of an individual to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion on
right to use contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of married
couples to be free from governmental interference with procreative choice).
184. 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980) (en banc).
185. 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981).
186. See supra note 61.
187. See In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 562, 432 N.E.2d 712, 719 (1982); In re C.D.M., 627
P.2d 607, 612 (Alaska 1981); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 237, 426 A.2d 467, 470 (1981); In re
Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 231, 608 P.2d 635, 638 (1980) (en banc).
188. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2356(d) (1979).
189. See supra note 97.
190. See In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 566, 307 N.W.2d 881, 893 (1981). In Eberhardy,
the court held that lower courts had jurisdiction to authorize sterilization petitions. However,
the court refused to allow those courts to exercise their jurisdictional power. Instead, the court
decided to defer to the legislature due to the irreversibility of the operation and the potential
infringement upon the right to procreate. The court stated that "the legislature is far better
able, by the hearing process to consider a broad range of factual situations." Id. The court
also believed that the legislature could best attempt an in-depth study on the issues involved,
with the help of experts in psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and medicine.
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"best interest" could not be eliminated even by strict substantive and procedural safeguards.' 9'
While all three dissenting opinions raised serious questions regarding the
ramifications of state-authorized sterilization of the developmentally disabled, they failed to recognize the possibility that denial of probate court
authority to approve sterilizations in exceptional cases "decides" the question
of procreative choice in favor of procreation, but without any safeguards
or standards to address the truly exceptional case.' 92 In effect, the dissenting
opinions would resolve the "decision" in favor of procreation no matter
how beneficial the operation would be for the incompetent individual, and
no matter how traumatic pregnancy and childbirth would be for the individual. The major strength of the dissents' position is that they completely
preclude probate court authority and discretion, and protect the individual's
fundamental right to procreation. On the other hand, the weakness of their
position is that they fail to recognize situations in which the "best interests"
of the individual overwhelmingly compel access to the equally fundamental
right to procreative choice. 93
The majority opinion provides the incompetent developmentally disabled
a forum in which to assert the fundamental right to procreative choice.
However, the requirements under section 2357 and the Hayes factors are an
inadequate replacement for well-crafted legislative standards designed to
specifically reduce the opportunity for abusive sterilization. As a result of
the majority's standards, even developmentally disabled individuals that
would benefit most from sterilization may be denied the chance to exercise
their newly-recognized constitutional right; an anomalous result from a court
concerned about the incompetent individual's chance to maximize his or her
potential.
IV.

IMPACT

The Conservatorship of Valerie N. decision is significant because it adds
California to the growing minority of states that recognize the procreative
rights of the incompetent developmentally disabled. The Valerie N. decision
demonstrates that despite the resulting controversy, the states are concerned

191. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 154, 707 P.2d at 791, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
192. Id. at 153, 707 P.2d at 781, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 407 (Lucas, J., concurring and

dissenting). Justice Lucas stated that the legislature had a compelling state interest in enacting
Probate Code section 2356(d). Moreover, he believed that the history of state compulsory
sterilization could have made the legislature decide that the potential for abuse was too great
to allow any court-authorized sterilizations. He also believed that the majority should have
deferred to the legislature due to the irreversibilty of the operation.
193. See In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 597, 307 N.W.2d 881, 907 (1981) (Day, J.,
dissenting) (what the majority does not recognize is that by refusing to allow the individual's
parents or guardians to decide in favor of sterilization, the majority decides the question in
favor of procreation and potentially against the individual's best interests).

19861

VALERIE N.

about allowing the developmentally disabled more freedom to live and
interact outside of the institutions. Other states may also decide to afford
the developmentally disabled their procreative rights to seek sterilization
where sterilization is the only practical method of birth control available for
the individual. These other states will probably also decide to adopt standards
culled from the Hayes, Grady, and Valerie N. decisions. However, if they
adopt a medical necessity prerequisite, or only allow sterilization if supervision is an inapplicable means of birth control, they will not be affording
the developmentally disabled access to their newly recognized procreative
rights.
The Valerie N. majority's opinion created ambiguities in the standards
governing nonvoluntary sterilization of the developmentally disabled. Probate
court judges will have to resolve these ambiguities on a case-by-case basis,
and the standards are subject to both broad and narrow interpretations.
Thus, the probate court judges must determine the construction to be given
to the medical necessity requirement. Narrowly interpreted, the standard
could be read to preclude access to court-authorized sterilization even where
there is clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the individual would
suffer severe psychiatric harm if she became pregnant and went through
childbirth. However, if judges read the section broadly, then severe psychiatric harm could be sufficient to allow further review under the Hayes
94
factors.
If the proponent of the sterilizaton has met and satisfied the medical
necessity requirement, the probate court judge must then analyze the evidence
under the Hayes factors and any other relevant factors brought to the
attention of the court. 195 The Hayes factors are also ambiguous as to certain
probate court determinations. For example, the requirement of "less drastic
means of contraception" can be read narrowly to require that several formulas of birth control pills have proven "unworkable or inapplicable" as
96
contraception. The majority opinion seems to favor the narrow reading.
Conversely, the probate judge could read the language to conclude that only
one formula of birth control pill need be tried, and if the individual rejects
that formula, then the birth control pill has been "proven unworkable or
197
inapplicable" as a contraceptive measure.
Moreover, a probate court judge could read the requirement narrowly to
require that supervision be proven inapplicable by clear, cogent, and con-

194. See supra note 32-38 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 146. The majority's narrow reading of the medical necessity standard
is contrary to prior decisions utilizing a medical necessity requirement in the context of the
sterilization of the mentally retarded.
196. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 150, 707 P.2d at 777, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
197. Id. at 150 n.28, 707 P.2d at 777 n.28, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 404 n.28. In a footnote the
majority stated that "forty-nine oral contraceptives are identified in the 1984 Physician's Desk
Reference." Id. The majority opinion also stated that the record did not show "whether or
not more than one formulation of birth control pill was tried." Id.
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vincing evidence. Conversely, the judge could read the supervision requirement consistently with the majority's habilitation rationale and conclude that
supervision need only be inapplicable where it would not substantially interfere with the individual's habilitation.
The confusion and complexity of the relationship between the medical
necessity threshold requirement and the Hayes common law standards can
be best appreciated by analysis of a hypothetical case based on the facts of
Conservatorshipof Valerie N. Assume that the parents of a twenty-five year
old developmentally disabled woman petition the probate court to be appointed conservators of the woman and for additional powers to consent
to a sterilization operation for her. The conservatee suffers from Down's
Syndrome, has an I.Q. of thirty and the developmental level of a four year
old child. Moreover, the conservators assert that the individual has not been
sexually active in the past and has physically rejected birth control pills
while in her early teens.
The conservatee's physician and psychologist assert in their declarations
that the conservatee is physically capable of procreation and is unable to
apply, or understand the implications of not applying less restrictive forms
of contraception. An intrauterine device (IUD) is also not feasible because
the conservatee refuses to co-operate in a pelvic exam. In addition, all three
declarants agree that pregnancy and childbirth would cause severe psychiatric
harm to the conservatee. Finally, the counselor has also stated that the
woman's parents have isolated her from society and social activity due to
the fear that she might become pregnant and that this isolation has substantially interfered with her ability to interact with other individuals.
The conservators' reason for petitioning the court for the operation is to
allow the conservatee the opportunity to participate in a state and federally
funded program designed to allow the developmentally disabled to live in a
community setting that provides for greater social interaction without the
need for constant supervision.
Under the majority's decision in Valerie N., the case would be scrutinized
under the medical necessity threshold requirement of section 2357. This
section requires that the conservatee be represented by an independent guardian ad litem, and provides that "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence" of
the "necessity" for the operation be presented. The hypothetical facts include
the declarations of the conservatee's personal physicians and counselor, and
all three agree that the conservatee would suffer "severe psychiatric harm"
if she were to become pregnant. However, under the majority's opinion,
"psychiatric" harm was not accepted as sufficient evidence of medical
necessity under section 2357. The conservators seek sterilization as a nontheraputic method of contraception and not as a theraputic measure to
protect the conservatee's life or physical health. 19 Thus, under the majority's

198. This reading of the "less intrusive" factor would better promote the individual's
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analysis, this case would end here despite the counselor's declaration that
the conservatee's isolation has interfered with her interest in maximizing her
developmental potential.
Alternatively, if the probate court judge reads the medical necessity requirement broadly to encompass psychiatric harm, and the proponent proves
the harm by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, then the next step would
be analysis under the Hayes factors. The Hayes factors place the burden of
proof on the proponent of the operation. Due to the extent of the conservatee's disability, the hypothetical conservator will probably be able to prove
that the conservatee is presently incapable of choice with regard to sterilization and not likely to develop the ability in the reasonably foreseeable
future.
Analysis under the remaining factors is more difficult because the court
could give them a broad or narrow interpretation. First, the proponent must
prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the conservatee is likely
to engage in sexual activity at the present time or the near future under
circumstances likely to result in pregnancy. A narrow interpretation of this
standard could require the individual to have engaged in sexual activity in
the past or present. It would be very difficult to prove that contraception
was necessary without some evidence of past sexual activity. Thus, even
though the conservatee made "inappropriate sexual advances" under the
facts of the hypothetical, the probate court could decide that there was no
"necessity for contraception." If, on the other hand, a probate judge were
to give the standard a broader interpretation, the judge could conclude that
the lack of evidence of past sexual activity is not determinative. Instead, the
court could construe the factor to mean that the absence of constant supervision presents a possibility of future sexual activity. Thus, the effectiveness
of the parents' efforts to supervise their daughter and the isolation of their
daughter from social activity, would not foreclose sterilization when they
want to allow her more freedom.
The requirement of "less drastic methods of contraception" also leaves
room for broad and narrow interpretations. The applicability of birth control
pills as contraception for an individual presents the question of how many
formulations of the pill must be proven "unworkable or inapplicable." The
majority opinion would require evidence that the conservatee physically
rejected several formulations before that method of contraception was ruled
out. However, probate court judges could require only one or two formulations to be proven inapplicable.

interest in obtaining a "best interest" sterilization. However, because of the irreversibilty of a
sterilization operation, this factor can best be read as requiring some reasonable number of
formulations to be tried and rejected. The exact number would depend on the reason the
individual rejected the pill, and on the possibility that different formulations would be rejected
by the individual. See infra note 204.
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Moreover, the proponent of the operation would have to prove that
supervision was "unworkable or inapplicable" as a method of contraception.
Under the facts of the hypothetical, the conservatee's parents have prevented
the conservatee from engaging in any sexual activity. In order for the
conservators to meet the "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence" standard
they would have to prove that the conservatee had engaged in sexual activity
in the past despite their best efforts at supervision. If the probate court
judge reads the factor as supervision of all interaction between the conservatee and members of the opposite sex, then that method of contraception
has not been "proven unworkable or inapplicable." The result is continued
isolation and supervision for the conservatee, and the parents' desire to
allow their daughter more freedom from isolation could be defeated.
Finally, the requirement that the conservators prove by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence that science is not on the verge of discovering new,
reversible contraception presents a difficult obstacle to court-authorized
sterilization. It requires the conservator to prove a negative' 99 and does not
account for the possibility that future methods of contraception may be
unworkable or inapplicable for the same reasons that current methods may
be inapplicable.3 ° Under the facts of the hypothetical, the conservators have
a very high burden of proof, and the Valerie N. majority left the probate
court judge without guidance on this issue. In future cases, the state courts
that adopt similar standards may have to decide whether a medical necessity
requirement presents an undue burden on the exercise of the right to procreative choice recognized by the Valerie N. majority and by other state
courts. 0'
Very few, if any, petitions for sterilization will meet the medical necessity
requirement. Consequently, analysis under the Hayes factors often will not
be necessary, and few wards or conservatees will be sterilized. Moreover, the
state courts may have to determine what construction the standards should
be given by the probate courts. The Valerie N. majority did not fully define
the scope of the "less drastic alternatives" standard, nor did it completely

199. Nontheraputic sterilization is sterilization for the benefit of the individual as a
method of contraception in which neither the life nor health of the individual is in jeopardy.
See Gray, supra note 20, at 533; Comment, A Woman's Right, supra note 39.
Theraputic sterilization may be necessary to protect the physical health of the patient. For
example, an operation may be necessary where a disease makes pregnancy dangerous for the
woman. See Maxon v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 3d 626, 185 Cal. Rptr. 516 (3rd. Dist.
1982) (theraputic sterilization approved where developmentally disabled woman had 80% risk
of developing cervical cancer without the operation).
200. Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d at 242, 608 P.2d at 644 (Stafford, J., dissenting) ("[current
state of medical knowledge" factor requires the proponent of the operation to litigate "nebulous
eventualities of science"). See also Comment, Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard, supra
note 66 ( Hayes factor concerning future contraceptive developments requires the proponent to
prove the impossible and forecloses sterilization).
201. Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d at 242, 608 P.2d at 644 (Stafford, J., dissenting).
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rule out the possibility of allowing severe psychiatric harm to fulfill the
medical necessity requirement. For example, the courts may have to decide
whether a probate court judge properly authorized a petition for sterilization
where the proponent produced clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that
a conservatee rejected one or two formulas of birth control pills, but the
other forty-seven were not tried.2 °2
The Valerie N. decision may also impact on collateral issues involving
other substantive due process rights. Under the court's decision, the developmentally disabled now may argue that they have the right to obtain an
abortion or to have their guardians and conservators assert that right for
them. 20 3 Under the Valerie N. standards, many of the same problems would
exist as did under the right to procreative choice. The medical necessity
requirement may unduly burden the right to obtain an abortion during the
first trimester of pregnancy. 2 4 Under United States Supreme Court decisions,
the state does not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an
absolute veto over the decision of the physician and the patient to terminate
pregnancy. 20 5 Perhaps the Valerie N. decision may produce a further exten-

202. See supra note 13.
203. The number of formulations of birth control pills that must be tried is dependent
upon the number of formulations that are different from each other, and thus provide the

possibility that the individual will not reject them. For example, birth control pills come in two
basic types: "combination" pills contain variable levels of estrogen and progestogen; "progestogen" pills contain only the hormone progestogen. The combination pill is both more widely
used and more effective. Depending upon the individual's adverse symptoms, a doctor could
prescribe a combination pill with a high, medium, or low level of estrogen, and a high, medium,
or low level of progestogen. Thus, there are a total of nine combinations. In addition,
"progestogen" pills could contain either progestogen, or a synthetic progestational agent such
as norethundrone or norgestral. See R. BRESSLER, M. BoGouFF & G. SUBAN-SHOPE, TBE PHYSICIAN'S DRUG MANUAL: PRESCRIPTION AND NONPRESCRIPTION DRUGS 831-32 (1981).
The number of formulations of oral contraceptives that must be ruled inapplicable in an
individual's case will depend upon (1)the reasons for the individual's adverse reactions, and
(2) the effectiveness of other formulations that would not cause a reaction. In order to protect
the individual from an unnecessary operation, an attempt must be made to find a formulation
that the individual can tolerate. Although this requirement may take time, it is preferable to
sterilization of the individual where another less intrusive means of birth control is available.
In the probate court proceeding, the proponent of the operation must present evidence
that the nine combinations of oral contraceptives, as well as the progestogen formula, have
been either (1) tried and rejected due to the nature of the individual's disability; or (2) either
rejected or contraindicated due to the nature of the individual's adverse reaction. The opponent
of the operation can cross examine the witnesses and present evidence to show that certain
formulations were not tried or are not inapplicable. The burden is on the proponent of the
operation to disprove the applicability of this and other forms of less intrusive contraception.
204. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to obtain an abortion during first
trimester of pregancy).
205. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (husband could not veto
wife's decision to obtain an abortion). But see Bellotti v. Baird, 433 U.S. 622 (1979) (where
minor is not sufficiently mature or emancipated, the state may require parental consent to an
abortion).
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sion of substituted judgment to allow the court to consent to an abortion
for the developmentally disabled ward or conservatee. In light of the Valerie
N. decision, one may persuasively argue that the right to obtain an abortion
cannot be prohibited merely on the basis of the incompetent individual's
disability.
Another collateral issue effected by the Valerie N. decision is the incompetent individual's right to refuse treatment. Courts have already utilized
substituted judgment to consent to electric shock therapy, 20 6 chemotherapy, 20 7
and organ transplants. 0 The Valerie N. decision utilizes these decisions and
grants the developmentally disabled rights that all competetent individuals
possess. Implicitly, the Valerie N. decision confirms that the developmentally
disabled have the constitutional right to terminate life support and drug
therapy. Moreover, it seems that the incompetent also have the right to
"consent" to operations that would promote their best interests such as an
operation to correct a cleft palate or other deformity. 2°9 The Valerie N.
decision recognizes the constitutional rights of the developmentally disabled
and thus brings those individuals closer to the status of competent persons.
V.

PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

The Valerie N, decision adopted a medical necessity requirement and the
Hayes framework as standards for court-authorized sterilization "pending
action by the legislature to establish criteria and procedural protection."
Because of the Valerie N. majority's decision to adopt a medical necessity
requirement, state legislation regulating access to sterilization for the incompetent developmentally disabled is necessary. This proposal will allow the
developmentally disabled greater opportunity to exercise their newly recognized procreative rights while protecting against the abuse prevelant under
210
eugenic sterilization statutes.
A.

Incompetency as a Threshold Requirement

Under this proposal, the ward or conservatee would be represented in the
probate proceeding by a disinterested guardian ad litem21' to protect against

206. Price v. Sheppard, 307 Minn. 250, 239 N.W.2d 905 (1976).
207. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.W.2d
417 (1977).
208. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
209. In re Weberlist, 79 Misc. 2d 753, 360 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1974) (court utilized substituted
judgment to authorize surgery for incompetent individual for dental work, hand surgery, surgery
for a cleft palate and jaw, and intercranial surgery for facial restoration). Id. at 785.
210. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (state could refuse to provide Medicaid
funding for nontheraputic abortions even though it funded the expenses of childbirth). The
Supreme Court held that Roe v. Wade meant that a woman has a fundamental right to be free
from "unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate
pregnancy." Id. It did not mean that a woman had a fundamental right to an abortion. Id. at
473-74.
211. The judge would appoint a public defender to represent the interests of the incom-
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a court-authorized sterilization that is not the last and best alternative for
the individual. The proponent of the sterilization must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the ward or conservatee is unable to choose between
sterilization and procreation and does not understand the relationship between sexual intercourse and conception. 2 2 The determination must be made
on the basis of evidence provided by independent physical and psychological
evaluation of the ward or conservatee by two physicians and two psychologists appointed by the court. Moreover, the probate court judge must meet
with the ward or conservatee and attempt to elicit his or her views regarding
sterilization, and his or her capacity for choice regarding procreation.2 3
Once the proponent establishes the individual's incompetency by clear and
convincing evidence, the proponent must then prove that contraception is
necessary for the individual. Proof of the necessity for contraception requires
that: (1) the ward or conservatee is capable of procreation based on medical
tests conducted by two independent physicians appointed by the court; and
(2) that the ward or conservatee was or is sexually active, or that the absence
of constant supervision or isolation presents a substantial likelihood of sexual
activity in the future. 214 The proponent must also establish, by the testimony
of physicians, that: (1) physical and psychological harm and complications
that would result from pregnancy and childbirth; and (2) a lack of physical
and psychological harm and complications would result from the sterilization
operation. The opponent must be allowed to cross examine witnesses, and
must be allowed to call physicians to demonstrate the possible consequences
of a sterilization operation, or the lack of potential problems related to
childbirth and pregnancy.
B.

Less Drastic Alternatives

The proponent must also prove by clear and convincing evidence that all
less drastic methods of contraception are unworkable or inapplicable. The

petent individual. To ensure that the individual's best interests are fully represented in the
proceedings, the guardian ad litem must be allowed to present evidence, call witnesses and cross
examine witnesses at the probate hearing.
212. The standard of clear and convincing evidence'should apply to these cases because
that standard represents an intermediate standard of review that is appropriate where more is
at stake than the mere loss of money. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
213. The judge must meet with the incompetent individual and attempt to elicit her views
regarding sterilization, procreation and child-rearing. This attempt protects against situations
involving truly involuntary sterilizations where the parents want to sterilize their child for their
own reasons rather than for the child's best interests.
214. Although the court should take into account past sexual behavior, it should also
focus on the programs available for the individual that allow more freedom from isolation and
greater social contact. At the same time, an individual's sexual activity ten years earlier should
not necessarily provide a basis for a probate court determination that the individual needs
contraception now. Factors for the court to consider include (1) the incompetent individual's
past sexual activity; (2) whether the individual is presently sexually active; and (3) the programs
and opportunities for social interaction available to the individual in the absence of the problem
of a potential pregnancy.
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less drastic alternatives standard requires evidence that the individual has
rejected at least five different formulation of birth control pills.215 In addition,
evidence must be presented that an IUD is unworkable or inapplicable for
medical reasons including: (1) the dangers presented to the individual's
health; and (2) complications presented by the individual's disability in the
performance of a pelvic examination for the insertion of an IUD. The
proponent must also produce clear and convincing evidence of the unavailability or inapplicability the other forms of contraception.
C. Best Interests and Habilitation
Finally, the court must examine other factors that demonstrate that the
operation would be in the individual's best interest and promote the individual's habilitation. The court must take into account the individual's age,
educability, and developmental capacity. The court must also consider the
psychological harm that would result from continued isolation and supervision of the ward or conservatee, and the services and opportunities available
for the individual that she would be allowed to participate in if not for the
guardian or conservator's fears of potential pregnancy. Moreover, the court
should consider the individual's capacity to care for a child when given
reasonable assistance. 2 6 The standards must not include a medical necessity
test because such a standard unduly burdens the incompetent individual's
opportunity to obtain a court-authorized sterilization.
VI. CONCLUSION

As a result of the California Supreme Court's decision in Conservatorship
of Valerie N., the probate court now has the authority to authorize sterilization of the developmentally disabled. The probate court judge's discretion
is circumscribed by strict substantive and procedural safeguards that protect
against the abuse prevalent under state eugenic sterilization statutes. In
adopting the safeguards, the court provided a forum in which the conservator
or guardian of a ward or conservatee can assert the incompetent individual's
right to procreative choice. However, the court's decision to adopt a strict
medical necessity standard unduly burdens the individual's ability to obtain
a sterilization that would be the last and best resort for the individual. The
strict standard contradicts the majority's apparent concern for habilitation,
and it does not adequately account for situations in which the individual
would truly benefit from a sterilization operation where the individual's life
or health are not in jeopardy.

215. See supra note 204.
216. The court must consider (1) the individual's ability to care for a child if given
reasonable assistance; and (2) the chance of the child being born retarded. This standard must
also take into account the individual's potential for child care in the future. For example, if
the individual is allowed greater social interaction and training, she may become able to care
for a child if given reasonable assistance.
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131

As a result of the decision in Conservatorshipof Valerie N., the developmentally disabled will be able to have the right to procreative choice
asserted for them by their guardians and conservators. Thus, the developmentally disabled can come closer to attaining the same rights and freedoms
that competent individuals possess. However, the majority's decision adopts
guidelines that are not adequately delineated and which are therefore, subject
to broad and narrow interpretations. Because the Valerie N. decision denies
access to court-authorized sterilization in all but medically necessary situations, this Note sets forth guidelines that would protect the incompetent
individual from abuse and provide greater access to the incompetent individual's newly recognized procreative rights.
John Hackett

